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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, sec. 78-2a-3 (2) (d),
1953, as amended.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a judgment and fine against
defendant for unsafe left turn.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

The court's negligence in observing an accurate reproduction

of accident scene, as conceded by the city's witness (Officer
Nelson) in trial testimony, constitutes prejudice.
2.

That supporting testimony from city's witness and defendant

demonstrate a violation of City Code and contributory negligence
by city's witness, to wit Nancy Borg.
3.

That the court's acknowledgement of city's witness' (Nancy

Borg's) vehicle being unsafe toward defendant's identifies a
breach of code which should be grounds for acquittal.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES OR RULES
The determinative provision in this matter is 12.44.210,
Salt Lake City Code Annotated.

This statute is reproduced

verbatim in the addendum.
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of Plaintiff
Salt Lake City and against Defendant Richard R. J. Uaugh entered

1

after a bench trial before circuit court judge Maurice D. Jones.
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The defendant was convicted by judge's verdict on March 26,
1990 of the offense of unsafe left turn.
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT
The defendant was found guilty of traffic violation of
unsafe left turn and ordered to pay fine of $75.00.
RELEVANT FACTS
On January 9, 1990 at 11:50 am defendant was driving a
truck/semi trailer west on 200 South and turning south on
500 West when he observed an Oldsmobile sedan facing north
behind the stop sign on 500 West but to the left of center of
roadway.

Defendant's turn was subsequently adjusted for the

reduced amount of space left to negotiate it. A collision
ensued between the car and the left rear wheels of the trailer,
carrying the car a distance in the direction of travel of the
trailer.
Both vehicles thereafter remained motionless awaiting the
reporting officer who immediately spray painted the street
adjacent to the position (vlocation) of each vehicle's tires.
This procedure located the car beyond the stop sign into the
crosswalk, with the actual point of impact (derived from skidmarks from the car) being even further into the intersection,
as noted by the reporting officer.
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At the intersection of 200 South and 500 West, the rightof-way is with 200 South (with defendant); with 500 West (Nancy
Borg) controlled by a stop sign from which one block west can be
viewed and a distance of two blocks east can be viewed.

An

intersection drawing from the Salt Lake City Transportation
Engineering Office, with the spray marks superimposed over it,
was prepared for trial court.

The reporting officer under oath

recognized the rendering as the accident scene as he found it.
Several issues were determined at the trial and acknowledged
by both Salt Lake City and defendant.

Those being:

1. That the

car was behind the stop sign when the truck commenced the turn
through the intersection, 2. That by the time the truck cab had
passed the car, the vehicle had proceeded into the intersection
where it was found by the reporting officer.
Salt Lake City Code Book dated 11-89 Title 12 Chapter
12.44.210 "Entering through Streets or Stop Intersections,"
under Article III "Right of Way and Yielding," letter D states
that ffIn the event that a driver, after having driven past a
stop sign, is involved with...a vehicle having right-of-way in
the intersection, such collision shall be deemed prima facia
evidence of such driver's failure to yield the right-of-way as
required by this section...11
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Insufficient evidence to support a conviction of defendant
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for unsafe left turn, with evidence to the contrary demonstrating
failure to yield by city's witness, to wit Nancy Borg.
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT
The following are the points of fact as found in trial
transcript, with relative codes, definitions, and supporting case
identifying those findings.
1.

Nancy Borg indicated she was stopped at stop sign when

defendant commenced his turn (pg 3 lines 8, 25; pg 4 line 19).
2.

Defendant corraborated that (pg 12 lines 22,23).

3.

Police officer Nelson states that Nancy Borg's car was

beyond, or forward of, the stop sign after the impact (pg 22
lines 1, 2, 16, 18). He further states that her car, at the
time of impact, was even further north (or further into the
intersection) (pg 22 lines 12, 14), Officer Nelson then clarifies
that Ms. Borg probably made her stop at the sign, as had been
universally agreed, then proceeded to a point further into the
intersection to stop again Qpg 23 lines 4, 5). The officer at
this point states that Ms. Borg is exempt from reasonable and
prudent actions Cpg 23 line 10).
4.

Defendant contended that Ms. Borg proceeded from her

original stop into the intersection for her subsequent stop
after defendant's cab (tractor) had passed her in the course of
his turn and he could no longer see her (pg 14 line 25; pg L5
lines 1, 2, 3). [Martin v. Stevens 121 Utah 484, 243 P.2d 750
(right-of-way need not anticipate outbursts of another's
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negligence)J
5.

(See addendum for complete finding.)

Even though Officer Nelson observed the accuracy of my

reproduction of accident scene (pg 21 lines 5, 6, 22, 23, 24,
25; pg 22 lines 1, 2), Judge Jones refused with a shake of his
head and a deference to attorney Ludlow to look at it ^pg 11
lines 23, 24)... and did not through the course of the trial
see said reproduction.

In the sense that in the absence of the

court viewing an accurate reproduction of the accident scene,
there is reasonable likeliness that there would have been a
contrary result had the court viewed it; prejudice is thereby
defined.
6.

Because Judge Jones had no accurate reference to accident

scene, he exhibited a misconception of facts stated in the
trial as to the distance the car was beyond the stop sign at
the time of impact.

Judge Jones said, ,la foot or two," when in

reality it was l%-2 car lengths (see reproduction of accident
scene in addendum; see trial transcript pg 21 lines 5, 6, 22,
23, 24, 25; pg 22 lines 1, 2). The car was found to be 5-6f
beyond the stop sign after the accident and Officer Nelson
states that it was beyond that at the time of the impact (pg 22
lines 12, 14;.
7.

Judge Jones finally states that Ms. Borg was "absolutely

safe for all traffic except11 trucks (pg 29 lines 4, 5). Yet in
Salt Lake City Code Chapter 12.44 Article III "Right of Way and
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Yielding" section 12.44.210 paragraph D says on pg 441, ff...a
vehicle having right-of-way..."

Furthermore, the definition of

vehicle, City Code 12.04.610 pg 413 states,f"vehicle" means
every device in, upon or by which any person or property is or
may be transported or drawn upon a highway...'

(See addendum

for complete definition.)
Because the Judge exempts the city's witness from being
safe toward truck traffic with right-of-way (pg 29 lines 4, 5)
by his verdict, he again demonstrates bias against trucks
being equal under law to cars.
CONCLUSION
Because the defendant/appellant was convicted of this
offense by a Judge's verdict in spite of the preponderance o£
trial testimony to the contrary, with none supporting the
plaintiff, the circuit court's decision should be reversed,
the fine should be refunded, and relief of reasonable cost
of defense awarded to defendant.

Dated this 11th day of October, 1990.

Richard Waugh Pro Se
Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing brief by depositing the same in the United States
mail, postage prepaid to the following:
Salt Lake City Prosecutors Office
451 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Dated this 11th day of October, 1990.

Richard Waugh
Defendant/Appellant

ADDENDUM
Salt Lake City Code Annotated, 1989
12.44.210
D.

Entering through streets or stop intersections.

In the event that a driver, after having drivenpast a

stop sign, is involved in a collision with a pedestrian having
right-of-way in a crosswalk or a vehicle having right-of-way
in the intersection such collision shall be deemed prima facie
evidence of such driver's failure to yield the right-of-way
as required by this section, but shall not be considered negligence per se. (Prior code Title 46, Art. 12 S 204)
Salt Lake City Code Annotated, 1989
12.04.610

Vehicle.

"Vehicle11 means eyery device in, upon or by which any person
or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway,
except devices moved by human power or used exclusively upon
stationary rails or tracks. (Prior code Title 46, Art 1 vS 58)
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Cite us - ^•: L'.'id i t :
M A R T I N v. S T E V E N S .
No. 7731.

Supremo Court of Utah.
May 1, V.CVi.
Action by Lynn XV. Martin against Paul
JT. Stevens fur damages arising out of colliQ;i>!i at iutt'i-scct ion l.otwoeu automobile of
j.lMinlifi' and that of defendant. The Third
judh 0:1 10>friet Tourf. Salt Lake County.
V. II. Kllett. J., granted <lelVn<lani\s motion
ft,r dismissal at close of plaintiffs evidence
..ml plaintiff appealed. Tin* Supremo Coiirr,
rro<'U«'tt. .1., held that u'hoihor plaintiff had
}„.c!i guilty of cont rih'itory m^liirenee in u«>t
_ cin.L: and avoidinir eHVets of Oofemlaiu's
.p-Lrli^ouce. ami if so, whether such failure
• viis proximate cause of collision, were questions for jury.
Cause reversed and remanded.
1. Appeal and Error C=>927(3)

On appeal from dismissal of plaintiff's
action at close of plaintiff's evidence, plaintiff is entitled to have review by appellate
court of all the evidence, together with
rverv logical inference most favorable to
plaintiff, which might fairly be drawn therefrom. Rules of Civil P r o c e d u r e , rule 41(b).
2. Automobiles 0=245(14, 44)

In action for personal injuries to plaintiff when his automobile was struck by that
,,f defendant at intersection, at which there
was no stop sign regulating traffic, wherein
:t appeared that plaintiff w a s virtually
t o p p e d at time his automobile was hit in
-ide by that of defendant, and testimony
:::dicated that defendant was going more
•han 32 miles per h o u r in 25 mile per
r.our zone, evidence was sufficient to warr.t::t submission to j u r y of issue of def'Tidant's negligence concerning
speed,
look-out, and defendant's duty to keep his
-immobile under safe control and on his
*xe of street.

issue may be taken from j u r y , defendant's
burden of proving both that plaintiff was
guilty of contributory negligence, and that
such negligence proximately contributed
to cause his own injury must be met and
established with such certainty that reasonable minds could not find to contrary, and
if there is any reasonable basis upon which
reasonable minds might conclude that they
a r e not convinced either that plaintiff was
guilty of contributory negligence or that
such negligence proximately contributed to
cause injury, plaintiff is entitled to have
question submitted to j u r y . 1
4. Automobiles 171(4)
W h e n vehicles are a p p r o a c h i n g and are
about to enter intersection at substantially
the same time, driver approaching from
right has right of way over one approaching from his left, but when one of such
vehicles reaches intersection prior to other,
without h a v i n g accelerated for such purpose, such motorist w h o first enters intersection has right of w a y over second, unless standard of due care precludes him
from proceeding because to do so would
h a z a r d collision.
5. Automobiles <O208

Motorist w h o entered intersection prior
to defendant and from his right had right
of way.
6. Automobiles C=>2Q8

Rule u n d e r which motorist is held
guilty of contributory negligence as matter
of law for failing to observe and avoid
collision at intersection with oncoming
d r i v e r u n d e r circumstances where other
d r i v e r m a y h a v e been, or was guilty o{
negligence in his a p p r o a c h , does not purport to lay down s t a n d a r d other than that
of o r d i n a r y and reasonable care under circumstances. 2
7. Automobiles C=>206, 208

3. Negligence <S=>I36(9, 31)
The question of contributory negli•.:'-:ice is usually for j u r y , and before such

Motorist w h o has r i g h t of way at intersection may not claim right of way in
face of d a n g e r which one exercising due

Ni.-lson v. Mauchley. Utah, 202 P.2d
"17: Toomcr's Estate v. Union Pacific
I^u'lroad Co.. Utah. 2.30 P.2d 103.

tion Co., 100 Utah, 280. 147 P.2d 875;
Iliekok v. Skinner, 113 Utah 1, 100 P.2d
514; Conklin v. Walsh. 11.3 Utah 270. 10.3
P.2d 437; Gren v. Norton, Utah, 213 P.
2d 350.

I'.ullof-k v. Luke. 08 Utah 501, 08 P.2d
•'-"'•'. .354; Sine v. Salt Lake Transporta-

71S
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care would see and avoid, but motorist is
of contributory negligence which Aa>
not bound to anticipate that other driver
a substantial proximate cause of the
would fail to accord him his right of way,
accident."
uncil in exercise of due care, he observes, upon which ground the motion was grant !
or should observe, something to warn him
Under the new Rules of Civil Procu\:r"
that other driver is driving negligentl) or 41(b), unless the court otherwise specificwill fail to accord right of way. 3
such a dismissal is with prejudice and i= a
final judgment. The plaintiff assigns ti •:
8. Automobiles 0245(80)
In action for personal injuries to plain- ruling as error.
tiff when his automobile was struck by
that of defendant at intersection at which
he had right of way, wherein it was contended that plaintiff was contributory
negligent as matter of law in not seeing and
avoiding effects of defendant's negligence,
issue whether plaintiff had exercised due
care for his own safety was for jury.

The sole question presented by plaintiffappeal is whether he is prevented from recovering because he was guilty of ncrhgence which proximately contributed tu
cause his own injury.

[1] In appraising the dismissal wine'was granted against the plaintiff, he i* entitled to have us review all of the evidenc ,
9. Automobiles 0^245(50)
together with even- logical inference wire1,
In action for personal injuries to plain- may fairly be drawn therefrom in the light
tiff when his automobile was struck at most favorable to him.
intersection at which he had right of way
Plaintiff left his home in Salt Lake Cit}
by that of defendant, wherein it was conat about 7:00 a. m. on September 25, l ° : n .
tended that plaintiff was contributory
and drove south along 18th East approachnegligent as matter of law in not seeing
ing its intersection with Stratford A\UUIL,
and avoiding effects of defendant's negliupon which defendant was approaching th-.
gence, if plaintiff was negligent in failing
intersection from the east. The weaP-"
to keep look out, whether such failure
and visibility were good and the roads dry.
to observe proximately caused collision was
Xo traffic signals or signs control train**
question for jury.
there. The northeast corner of the intersection, across which these travellers wmiM
see each other, is blind in that there i-c
McCullough, Boyce & McCullough, Salt a high fence along the west property line
Lake City, for appellant.
and there are vines, bushes and trees wric':
Ray R. Christensen, Salt Lake City, for obscure the view. The width of aspha :
surface of 18th East is 26 feet; of Stratrespondent.
ford Avenue 2S feet.
CROCKETT, Justice.
Plaintiff said he was travelling 10 to 1As Lynn \V. Martin was driving south miles per hour, slowing down as he apalong 18th East through its intersection proached the intersection. He first louku*
writh Stratford Avenue, the defendant com- to the west, then to the east from whence
ing along Stratford Avenue from the defendant would have been approaching
east, crashed into the middle of the left At this instant he was approximately -1
side of his car causing personal injury to feet from the intersection and he could see
plaintiff and damaging his automobile. At 150 to 3)0 feet eastwa rd but saw no car
the trial, after plaintiff had presented all coming from that direction. Lie apparently
of his evidence, defendant moved for a assumed from this observation that there
dismissal upon several grounds, among was no car coming from the east close
which were:
enough to constitute any hazard to hiri.
"i4» The plaintiff's evidence * * *
turned his attention back to the intersection
show;- the plaintiff to have been guilty
and the west and proceeded. He first s^u'
3. II»^> v. KobmMm. lot* I tan r,u, 103 lVJd :>!<>; Louder v. Holluy. Utah, 233 IVJd :U>.

MARTIN v STEVENS
Cite as 2-i

.jeundant'b car at a point about oO feet
c i-i ot the intersection when he heard
screeching1 as defendant's brakes were ap. iiul. Plaintiff applied his own brakes and
\,A- -tt-pped, or virtually so, a little to the
.ourh oi the center of the intersection when
be was struck. The left front fender and
V'KL! of the defendant's car hit the front
• „^t of the left front door of plaintiff's
The crabh knocked plaintiff uncont l l r.
y -,ii[s and his automobile must have rer - tnied in gear as it traveled a total di*- j'cr of 15o feet, flr-t going on south and
. .o '-K and then \ o ring more to the west,
r i^.ni: two front >ards and a hedge before
Defendant's auto: • / ! / coming to re-t.
-(/'lle came to rest about IS feet south of
• , pnmt of impact. His skid marks ex» '<[(<: east from that point a distance of
-7 »o 6: feet, and indicated that as he hit
i-it'tf hi« car was about its width (lacked
j_"> si tilth of the center line of Stratford
\ i nno.
TKre was testimony by Officer Kenneth
«" I\irn^\\orth that, if the defendant's
' >rr« h\le had come to a complete stop
;
:er -kidding the 57 feet, his speed would
••i\e been 52 miles, or more, per hour.
.V:; momentum left after the skid would
r.present additional speed. It must have
• Kcceded the 32 miles per hour considerably
c mse oi the force with which the plam• -fs car was struck (it wras damaged so
i iU that it could only be sold for salvage)
i al^o because the 57 feet represented
- r'y the actual skid after the reaction time
-id passed and the brake was applied. It
•°g a residential area, the admitted
i limit is 25 miles per hour.

Utah
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[3] The question of contributory negligence is usually for the jury and the court
should be reluctant to take consideration
of this question ot fact from it. XieKun v.
Mauchley, Utah, 202 P.Zd 547; Toomer'*
Estate v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., Utah,
239 P.2d 163. The expressions in those
cases are in accord with this uniformly
accepted doctrine. The right to trial by
jury should be safeguarded. Before the
issue of contributory negligence may be
taken from the jury, the defendant's burden
of proving- both fa) that plaintiff wa<
guilty of contributory negligence, and (b)
that such negligence proximately contributed to cause his own iniur\, miM be
met, and established with such certainty
that reasonable minds cord 1 not find to the
contrary; conversely, if there is any reasonable basis, either because of lack of
evidence, or from the evidence and the fair
inferences arising therefrom, taken in the
light most favorable to plaintiff, upon which
reasonable minds may conclude that they
are not convinced by a preponderance of
the evidence either (a) that plaintiff was
guilty of contributory negligence or (b)
that such negligence proximately contributed to cause the injury, the plaintiff is entitled to have the question submitted to a
jury.

The defendant makes some far-reaching
contentions respecting the law of this state
governing traffic at intersections. The
doctrine he contends for, reduced to its bare
substance is this: That an intersection collision will not occur unless both of the
drivers are negligent and fail to see each
other, or having seen one another, attempt
to win a race to the intersection. He
r
2] From the forgoing facts concerning maintains virtually that no matter how-*• JU. and considering the defendant's duty negligent the defendant may be it is still
• > kt t j> a proper lookout, to keep his car the plaintiff's duty to avoid the collision.
•:• i< r safe control and on his right side He states in his brief: ''And if the defend• the street, and the matter of yielding the ant were travelling 50 miles per hour, that
r ^ t of way hereinafter discussed, it is would have been fair notice to the plaintiff
"i. -tioned that the jury could have found that the defendant had no intention of
•" ueghgent.
yielding the right of way." and further:
**\\- then proceed to the inquiry: Can it "The rule that both drivers involved in an
-ail as a matter of law that the plain- intersection collision are guilty of negli•'VCIN gmlty of contributory negligence gence as a matter of law is a health} rule
~h proximately contributed to cause his and conforms to the realities of modern day
driving conditions."
' :: jurv?

750
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These contentions of the defendant are
fallacious. The law has never been so
declared by this court. Concurring in the
case of Bullock v. Luke, 98 Utah 501, 98
P.2d 350, 354, Mr. Chief Justice Wolfe said:
" * * * we must be careful not to
stretch contributory negligence to the point
where we make it incumbent upon one not
only to drive carefully himself, but to drive
so carefully as always to be prepared for
some sudden burst of negligence of another
and be able to avoid it. * * * " The
substance of that thought has been expressed numerous times in the intersection
c: ••••s re'icd imon by the defendant. The
rule he contends for would throw a protective cloak over wrongdoers and penalize
careful drivers by requiring them to anticipate and avoid the negligence of others.
If a driver has to drive his car under the
assumption that every one else is apt to
be negligent, the next step would be for him
to conclude that he better get off the streets
entirely or some one is likely to hit him,
and abandon the streets to those who were
just willing to take chances. If, under
circumstances such as present in this case,
where the plaintiffs right of way is so clear
that no reasonable person could have any
doubt about it, he could not assume that he
would be afforded his right of way, the only
way drivers could safely proceed at an intersection would be to resort to: "You first,
my dear Gaston,—no, after you, my dear
Alphonsc/' procedure or get out and hold
a conference before either could safely proceed.

caution and circumspection, he could ha\e
observed that the defendant was being negligent and thus have afforded the defenda:.;
the use of the intersection and avoided the
collision.
[4] It was for the very purpose o:
avoiding uncertainty and confusion at intersections, and in order to make the movement of traffic both practical and safe, that
rules have been established so that drive":
will know which has the right of way. A:.
excellent text statement of the rights ai::
duties of drivers at intersections is contained in 2 Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice, Perm.Ed., § C/A
to 994 inc., pp. 206 et seq. The first o:
these rules is that the vehicle which enter?
the crossing first has the right of way over
a second one coming from another direction, unless under the standard of due care,
he should not proceed because to do so
would hazard a collision. In close case-,
this test is somewhat unsatisfactory because
oi the difficulties, after a collision has occurred, of determining who had the rig-*
of way on that basis. The text just referred to correctly states : " * * * The mere
fact of reaching the intersection first is r."
longer recognized as the sole test as to vo<o
has the right of way." In order for a
driver to claim the right of way on i —
basis of entering the intersection first. •*
must appear that he did not speed up ju-*for the purpose of claiming the right <•'
way, and also that the margin or distandby which he claimed it was so clear as to :••«•
without doubt.

Such a state of uncertainty and confusion
would not be consistent with the purpose of
the law, which is to so regulate traffic as to
permit the most efficient and expeditious
use of the streets consistent with safety.
It is true indeed that safety is the first and
most important consideration and that careful driving is to be encouraged to the utmost possible degree. However, it does not
follow that it is necessary to so interpret
the law that, wherever there is a collision
at an intersection, both drivers are guilty
of negligence, nor that in a case such as this
the plaintiff should be precluded from recovery because by hindsight it may appear
that by using some extraordinary degree of

The second rule is easier to apply *'•'•'therefore more satisfactory, that is: Vv-vehicles are approaching and about to ei^
the intersection at substantially the sa:-'time, the driver approaching from the n has the right of way over the one approaching from his left. The same text s-}"'This rule has been called the basic !-'••
governing operation of vehicles at stf^1intersections.'' Necessity dictates that *-z-'
rule govern unless one vehicle is en n!: - •
ahead of the other in entering- the in'*-'-*
section to assure him a clear wjriiw L
safety.
[5] By both of these rules plaintiff *-••
the right of way. He approached -'•'-'

MARTIN v. S T E V E N S
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entered the intersection so far ahead of
• e:\ndaiit that no doubt could arise as to
A inch had the right of way on that basi^;
t \ e u if doubt had arisen, then that is the
very circumstance in which the rule of the
driver a p p r o a c h i n g from the right governs.
ylimtii'l aLso had the right of way on that
ground.
[6] D e f e n d a n t a r g u e s that, conceding
the plaintiff's right of way and that the
defendant was negligent, yet plaintiff was
guilty oi contributory n e g h g e n c e as a
matter of law for not seeing and avoiding
the effects of defendant's negligence. In
support of his position he c i t e s : Bullock v.
Luke, s u p r a ; Sine v. Salt Lake T r a n s p o r t a tion Co., 106 Utah 280, 147 P.2d X75;
Ilickok v. Skinner, 113 U t a h 1, 190 P.2d
514; Conklin v. Walsh, 113 U t a h 276, 103
P.2d 437; and C r e n v. N o r t o n , Utah, 213
P.2d 356. as cases w h e r e a driver was held
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law for failing to observe and avoid
collision with another o n c o m i n g driver under circumstances w h e r e the other d r h e r
may have been, or was, guilty of negligence
in his a p p r o a c h . In order to avoid burdening this opinion with a repetition and
analysis of each of these cases, one principle which distinguishes t h e m from the
case at bar can be succinctly s t a t e d : E a c h
oi them was decided upon the proposition
that the circumstances w e r e such that the
driver held to be negligent as a matter of
law, either observed, or in t h e exercise of
due care should have observed, the m a n n e r
in which the other d r i v e r was a p p r o a c h i n g
the intersection and clearly could by ordinary reasonable care have avoided the collision. O r to state it in other words, the
negligence, o r m a n n e r of driving, of the
other d r i v e r was such t h a t the driver appraising t h e situation w a s alerted to it or
by using d u e care would have been so
alerted in time so that by the exercise of
ordinary precaution he could have avoided
the collision. And, in each of these cases,
this seemed to the court so clearly manifest
that reasonable minds could not find to the
contrary.
T h e r e h a s been and still is much discussion a n d d i s a g r e e m e n t as to whether
the various fact situations in those cases

come under the foregoing rule. Put there
is no disagreement about the rule. If as
s t . i u d by .Mr. Chief Justice Wolfe ::i hii
c o n c u r r i n g opinion, the facts of llickuk v.
Skinner, supra, do not b r i n g it within the
principle above stated, it was wrongly
decided, and is hereby overruled.
Those
cases do not purport to lay down any other
s t a n d a r d than that of o r d i n a r y reasonable
care. Xo m a t t e r how far afield one r\.y go
in reviewing, analyzing a n d rationalizing
the decisions in the^e intersection cases,
he must always come back to the one basic
concept which underlies and controls the
L a w of T o r t s : the conduct of the mythical
but extremely useful " o r d i n a r y reasonable
prudent man under the circumstances", all
of which is encompassed in the shorter
p h r a s e ''due c a r e " .
[7] T h a t is the s t a n d a r d we apply to
the plaintiff. Admittedly, the right of way
is not absolute. One who has it, under one
or both of the a f o r e m e n t i o n e d rules may
not, with foolhardy a s s u r a n c e , claim the
right of way in the face of a danger which
one exercising due care would see and
avoid. Although plaintiff had the right of
w a y u n d e r both rules above referred to, yet
t h e r e devolved upon him the duty of due
care in observing for other traffic. But in
doing so he had the right to assume, and to
rely and act on the assumption that others
would do likewise; he w a s not obliged to
anticipate either that other drivers would
drive negligently, nor fail to accord him
his right of way, until in the exercise of
due care, he observed, or should have observed, something to w a r n him that the
other driver was d r i v i n g negligently or
would fail to accord him his right of way.
If this principle is not clear in the earlier
U t a h cases, it is firmly established by the
m o r e recent expressions of this court.
A case which illustrates the matter very
well is that of Hess v. Robinson, 10° Utah
60, 163 P.2d 510, w h e r e the plaintiff, driving
s o u t h w a r d along a t h r o u g h street, failed
to see defendant's ambulance coming into
the intersection from the west. It was held
t h a t even though plaintiff was negligent in
not seeing the ambulance, the question as to
wdiether his negligence proximately contributed to cause his injury was properly
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submitted to the jury. (Three members of
the court, Mr. Chief Justice Wolfe and Mr.
Justice Wade and Mr. Justice McDonough
indicated that both were jury questions/)
The main opinion reasoned that if he had
seen the ambulance, the jury could find it to
be within his duty of due care to assume
that it would obey the stop sign, and that
he was entitled to proceed through the
intersection until it became apparent to him
that the ambulance would not stop.
In the later case of Lowder v. Holley,
Utah, 25$ P.2d 350, the plaintiff failed to
observe the defendant's vehicle approaching from the right. There was evidence
from which it could be found that at the
time the plaintiff was about ready to enter
the intersection the defendant was 250
feet away. It was held that the question
whether plaintiff's failure to see defendant's
approach was negligence was a question of
fact. It was also observed that had he
seen defendant it could be found to be
within his duty of due care to assume that
the defendant would yield him the right of
way.
The governing principles in the very
recent case of Poulsen v. Manness, Utah,
241 P.2d 152, are identical to the instant
case. The plaintiff stopped at the intersection, looked to the east where he could
see about 400 feet, assumed there was no
traffic constituting a hazard from that
direction, looked back to the west and proceeded on into the intersection where he
was struck. The question of whether his
failure to look again to the east constituted
negligence and also whether such negligence proximately contributed to cause the
collision were held to have been properly
submitted to the jury. For other Utah
cases in accord with the holdings of the
cases discussed above see Ilardmau v. Thurman, Utah, 239 P.2d 215; Xielson v.
Mauchley, supra.
[8] We revert briefly to plaintiff's evidence. As he was about 20 feet north of
the intersection, he looked cast, then backto the west and didn't see defendant until
the latter set his brakes just before the
impact. This testimony should be interpreted in the light of well known facts con-

cerning a person's ability to see. The
anahsis of this ca^e in the brief> proceedupon a fallacy which is common in the t r : /
and determination oi facts in lawsuit* « f
this type: That is, it seems to be a-sunud
that human vision projects as through a
tunnel to the point of main focus seui.i;
practically nothing else. Ignored is th
fact that the sight is diffused, that is, the
normal field, or angle of vision (the width
of area one can see to either side of h>
direct line of vision) is quite wide, in fact
about 180°. This is quickly and easi!)
demonstrated by placing one's fincer back
of his line of vision, say back of his ear,
a few inches out from the head and bringing it gradually forward. The e>e ui'l
perceive it about as it gets up even with
the eye. With this breadth of vision, although plaintiff withdrew his attention
from the east back toward the intersection
and to the south and west, it seems likely
that he would have been aware, out of the
"corner of his eye" so to speak, of the approach of the Stevens' car. However, the
jury could believe that he did not see it a:
all until it was 57 feet from the impact,
or it may have assumed that what he meant
by saying he didn't see it until that time
was that his attention and direct vision.
were then first focused upon defendart.
Whichever view is taken, under the lav.*
as we view* it, a jury question as to due
care on plaintiffs part was presented.
We must remember that there were three
other streets to give some attention to ahe approached the intersection. All of tinattention could not very well or safely i •focused on any one at any gi\en in>ta'*
Remaining aware of the others and iri"* •'<them secondary attention, the n'.tint: .
would look to the west, as he said he d:«'.
to observe for the favored traffic to whicn
he must give right of way, if any was near.
He then looked to the east and saw no ca"*
within the extent of his vision, 15»> to 3'°
feet. At that instant he was entitled to
assume, absent am thing to warn him to tin
contrary, that am car approaching fn,::1
that direction would do so at a lawful ra^
of speed, that is. not to exceed about ~-"*
miles per hour. He then changed his ma:^
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On* a* J l r J.I r i :
. ^ • / : o i i back to the intt r u c t i o n and the
W A D E , McPO.VOUU.II, and
IIEX•h .tiid 'V' ^t Mid proceeded.
R I u D , }]., concur.
].v,,m that point, 3* feet north of the inW O L F E , Chief Justice (concurring
in
., a c t i o n , where pLuititf made bib observa., Ml . t<> the ea^t, he would h a \ e to travel the result;.
l() a 5'> to 55 feet to get past the center
I concur in the result and in t h a t p a r t
i ( : the intersection and thus be clear of any
of the reasoning supporting the result which
, ( a b o u n d traffic. A t 15 miles per hour, I set out as follows: that the plaintiff
( r 22 feet per second, this would take him
h a d the right oi w a y ; that at least for the
w'-.jhtly less than 3 seconds. Assuming that purposes of determining the d e f e n d a n t ' s
r -, wc<bound traffic would be t r a v e l i n g
right to dismissal the defendant must be
. ::'.>m the speed limits of 25 miles per hour, t r e a t e d as having been negligent in t r a v e r s , r / o feet per Second, the plaintiff would ing the approach to the intersection at a n
;- ; ,; C had time to pass clear of any car excessive speed; that it was clearly a j u r y
" a greater distance than lf'S feet to the question whether under all the circum' 3 Sec. x 3o') T h e evidence is t h a t stances the plaintiff was guilty of contribuui.t.
,; i\nd.mt was at least 150 feet away and tory n e g l i g e n c e ; and that there is evithe jury could find more than 200 feet.
dence from which a jury could find that he
A^ hereinabove suggested, we must avoid
measuring the plaintiff's duty and c h a r g i n g
him with negligence because he may h a v e
failed to anticipate and avert negligence on
W e do not bet he part of the defendant.
j.;^e that it can be said that all reasonable
jTimcls must agree that the plaintiff's action
in looking to the east and then proceeding,
r e h i n g on his right of way over traffic from
that direction, and the assumption that a n y
such traffic would not exceed a reasonable
and lawful rate of speed, amounted to
negligence on his part.
[9] T h e r e is also the question of p r o x imate cause. Should we assume that all
reasonable men must conclude that plaintiff's failure to keep m o r e of a lookout to
the east amounted to negligence, would
they also all agree that such failure to observe proximately caused the collision?
Supi use he had looked continuously to the
ui>t as he approached and proceeded into
the intersection and had seen d e f e n d a n t
coming. Could he not, within the limits of
reasonable care, have assumed d e f e n d a n t
world slow up and yield the right of way,
or \vonld the defendant's speed and p r o x imity to the intersection have been a w a r n ing to the plaintiff that he would not do so?
Under the rulings in H e s s v. R o b i n s o n ;
Lowdcr v. Holley; and Pou'sen v. M a n n e s s ,
all cited above, this was also a j u r y question.
Cause is reversed and remanded.
to appellant.
243 P.2d—43
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was not so guilty. This much supports t h e
decision for reversal and I rest my concurrence on it. By this, I do not wish it to be
implied that I do not agree with the statem e n t s made by Mr. Justice Crockett in t h e
rationale by which he reaches the result.
T h e opinion shows evidence of a commendable attempt to find common principles
g o v e r n i n g our intersection decisions.
In
m a n y and perhaps most of those statements
I can a g r e e . In others, I cannot. But I
t h i n k it a w o r k of supererogation for me to
discuss each one separately and cast myself
in the role of a critic as to them. I a m
inclined to the view that the writer of t h e
opinion in his attempt to bring all the intersection cases u n d e r common principles w a s
on solid g r o u n d so long as he did not g o
beyond the broad principle that each d r i v e r
m u s t exercise due care under all the circumstances s u r r o u n d i n g his traversal of t h e
i n t e r s e c t i o n ; as to more refined principles,
intersection cases will v a r y with the circumstances. I cannot agree that Hickok v.
Skinner, 113 U t a h 1, 190 P.2d 514, m a y be
justified on the theory that the driver w h o
had t h e right of way in that case w a s
negligent as a m a t t e r of law because he
"observed,
or in the exercise of due care
should hai'e observed, the m a n n e r in which
the other driver was approaching the intersection and clearly could by o r d i n a r y
reasonable care have avoided the collision."
1 E m p h a s i s added.)
This statement begs
the question. T h e very t h i n g complained
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about in that case is that the driver who
unquestionably had the right of way, was
held to be negligent in failing to reappraise the situation. He was not given the
benefit of the preference the law accorded
him nor of the presumption which the law
should indulge him, viz. that the non-preferred driver would slow down in deference to his right. It appears to me that
those elements should have gone to the jury
to determine if under all the circumstances
the driver who was in law held guilty of
contributory negligence, was in fact so
guilty.
I do not think in the Hickok case it
could be said as a matter of law that under
the circumstances Hickok was negligent in
proceeding under his right of way and that
he should have been or was alerted to the
fact that the other party would not surrender it to him.
In that case the facts are not such as to
justify the statement that "the negligence,
or manner of driving, of the other driver
was such that the driver appraising the
situation was alerted to it, or by using due
care would have been so alerted in time so
that by the exercise of ordinary precaution
he could have avoided the collision."
Whether that was so should have been left
to the jury. For the lower court or this
court to take upon itself the function of
saying that the favored driver was negligent unless no reasonable mind could say
otherwise, simply reintroduces the element
of requiring the preferred driver to drive
so as to avoid the negligence of the disfavored driver which both Mr. Justice
Crockett and I have given warnings against.
Or it introduces a pseudo last clear chance
doctrine.
I appreciate the brave effort of Mr.
Justice Crockett in trying to explain the
Hickok case and in attempting to bring it
under a common category but it requires a
perversion of the facts to do so. That case
should have gone to the jury. As long as it
holds the sway of authority, counsel for
this defendant and other defendants may
justifiably contend for what Mr. Justice
Crockett states is counsel's contention herein, to wit, that virtually no matter how
negligent the defendant may be it is still

the plaintiffs duty to avoid the colhsior,
a length to which, however, I do not thn \
the attorney for defendant really goes
Of cou^e, I do not agree with the contention of the defendant in this case that "if
the defendant were traveling 50 miles per
hour, that would have been fair notice tu
the plaintiff that the defendant had no intention oi yielding the right of was "
Certainly if the plaintiff did have that "fa1"
notice" and had time to stop and did no',
the jury could under proper instruction^.
have found the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence. But the jury would ha\e
also had before it the fact that when he
timely looked east he did not see any car
coming west (toward him) within a distance of 150 to 200 feet; that he saw defendant's car for the first time when it \va«
60 feet from him and he was then alertc:
by the screech of its brakes; and the jur\
would determine whether this was "fair
notice" under those circumstances. The
fact seems to be that the defendant countc 1
himself one of those lucky chaps who could
speed into intersections and meet no cars.
There are minds which appear to operate
that way.
Perhaps in the Hickok case, a reappraise
merit of the situation if it had been made at
the right moment would have alerted thfavored driver to the fact that the disfavored driver was not going to yield t <right of way and perhaps given him time :•;
avoid the collision. I say "at the nc % :
moment" because a moment sooner thu'.
that "right moment" the driver of the fav«r
ed car might still have thought the oth' r
driver would slow down to let him p--'
whilst a moment later than that "right m •
ment" it would have been too late to avo the collision. This points up, I think, trc
duty we put upon the favored driver i"*
those cases. The disfavored driver ha*
the duty to slow down; and while tr.*
favored driver cannot totally ignore t.other and blindly traverse the intersection.
he can, until he is otherwise put on noti-epresume that the disfavored driver ^v:"
slow down and permit him to pass, but it '
for the jury to determine whether unf-<all the circumstances the favored drf>'
could indulge in the presumption tmu <• "
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(;-\favored driver would yield him the right
(.: ^<\v an '^ under the circumstances, the
u-t itrnc it should give that presumption, if
It is just these factors winch make
i<n \.
•- a jury question. In the case of Farrell
Vp Cameron, 98 Utah 68, 94 P.2d I0o>\ this
court held that a driver who notes that a
•ur approaching from the opposite direction
loo feet away is 12 to 16 inches over the
center line of the highway is negMg^nt as
Iv matter of law if he fails to then turn his
c t r to the right to an extent which will
r
:> jow the ca s to pass if the oncoming car
r, mains o v u the center line, provided that
T ': t re i^> sufficient space to the right in which
• ,j turn and time for the driver to do so.
l:\ a dissenting opinion I contended that the
duty of the driver to move to the right
ordinarily would not arise immediately upon
seeing t n e approaching car on the wrong
s:Je of the highway, but that the duty to
move to the right arose only when the
driver had notice or reasonably should
have taken notice that the approaching car
did not intend to timely retreat to its own
side of the highway. Until such time, however, I argued that the driver could assume
that the approaching car would observe the
law of the road and seasonably move to its
proper side of the highway so as to pass
without interference. In that case we did
not have the benefit of a transcript of the
testimony adduced at the trial but had before us only the findings of the trial court.
I thought that there was nothing in the
findings of fact which would warrant us in
concluding as a matter of law that when
the approaching car was 100 feet away, the
time had arrived when the driver of the
other car knew or should have reasonably

known that the oncoming car did not intend
to move over to its own side of the highway.
Somewhat the same principle applies in
man\ of the intersection cases and, as Mr.
Justice Crockett suggests, especially in
those intersection cases where both drivers
are visible to each other throughout their
approach and traverse of the intersections.
I think my only difference with him is that
in the Hickok case the question of whether
the circumstances were such that the favored driver should or could have noticed that
the other (disfavored) driver was not going
to yield his right of way was for the jury.
It was not a case for a pronouncement by
this court of negligence in law on the part
of the favored driver. Xo attempt should
be made at this time to distinguish the
Hickok case. It should be expressly overruled or left to die of inanition.
As to Lowder v. Holley, Utah, 233 P.2d
350, I stated in my concurrence the ground
on which I placed it. Likewise in Poulsen
v. Manness, Utah, 241 P.2d 152, I did the
same thing. I must refer the reader to
those two cases for the factors which I
thought distinguished them from Hickok v.
Skinner, supra, and Conklin v. Walsh, 113
Utah 276, 193 P.2d 437. Those concurrences included other general observations
which I made in this segment of the law
which I think are in general accordance
with Mr. Justice Crockett's opinion in this
case. However, I shall not guarantee that,
but there is no necessity or aid in going into
those concurrences. They speak for themselves.
For the above reasons I can concur only
in the results.
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